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I. Introduction 
The following is an update on Texas’s case law and legislative activity 
relating to oil, gas and mineral law from August 1, 2016 to July 1, 2017. 
II. Case Law 
A. Production in Paying Quantities and Lease Maintenance 
1. BP America Production Company v. Laddex, Ltd.1 
BP acquired a 1971 oil and gas lease that contained a 5-year primary 
term, and continued “as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from said 
land hereunder.”2 The Lessee drilled one producing well that steadily 
produced until its production sharply decreased in August 2005.3  
Production resumed in November 2006.4  Lessors’ attorney sent BP a letter 
in April 2006 claiming that the lease had terminated for failure to produce 
in paying quantities; BP did not respond.5  The Lessors granted a top lease 
to Laddex in March 2007.6  In April 2007, the lessee of the top lease sued, 
seeking lease termination based on failure to produce in paying quantities.7 
The top lease language provided:  
[T]he primary term of this lease shall commence [(a)] upon the 
date written releases are filed . . . or (b) upon the date a judgment 
of a court of competent jurisdiction terminating the base 
lease . . . becomes final and nonappealable . . . . This Lease is 
intended to and does include and vest in Lessee any and all 
remainder and reversionary interest and after-acquired title of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 513 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. 2017). 
 2. Id. at 477-78. 
 3. Id. at 478. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
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Lessor in the Leased Premises upon expiration of any prior oil, 
gas or mineral lease . . . .8  
In Texas, production that does not permit a lessee to pay operating 
expenses will not keep a lease in existence, even though the lease does not 
specifically require paying quantities but merely provides that the lease will 
continue for so long as “oil or gas is produced.”9 Clifton v. Koontz10 refined 
that rule of law, for which there is now a two prong test: (1) Does income 
from a well’s production exceed operating and marketing costs?11 If yes, 
the inquiry ends, and production in paying quantities is established. If no, 
(2) under all relevant circumstances, would a reasonably prudent operator 
continue to operate in the same manner in hope of making a profit, and not 
for mere speculation?12 
BP moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
arguing that the top lease violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.13 The 
court denied this motion.14 The trial court asked the jury if (1) the well 
failed to produce in paying quantities from August 1, 2005 to October 31, 
2006, and (2) if, under all the relevant circumstances, a reasonably prudent 
operator would not continue, for the sole purpose of making a profit and not 
merely for speculation, operating the well as it was between those dates.15 
The jury not only determined that there was a lack of production in paying 
quantities between August 2005 and October 2006, but that a reasonably 
prudent operator would not have continued to operate the well for profit.16 
As a result, the 1971 lease terminated.17 BP appealed, claiming that (1) the 
top lease violated the Rule Against Perpetuities; (2) no evidence of lack of 
production in paying quantities or that a reasonably prudent operator 
wouldn’t continue to operate the well; and (3) the jury charge allowed 
consideration of incompetent expert testimony.18 
On appeal, the trial court’s ruling was reversed and remanded, as the 
lease was found not to violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, since Texas 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 482 (citing Garcia v. King, 164 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1942)). 
 10. 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959). 
 11. Id. at 691.  
 12. Id. 
 13. Laddex, 513 S.W.3d at 478-89. 
 14. Id. at 479. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 483-87. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  
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leases create a fee simple determinable with the lessor retaining a 
possibility of reverter, which is a vested future interest.19  However, the trial 
judge erred in limiting the jury’s consideration of profitability to a specific 
fifteen month period, preventing consideration of the fact of profitability 
before and after.20 
On review by the supreme court, the issues were (1) whether a top lease 
can be saved from the Rule Against Perpetuities (the “Rule”) by purporting 
to convey a “possibility of reverter” which may never revert to lessor, and 
(2) whether a jury can consider profitable production post-lease 
expiration?21 
As to the first point of inquiry, the court noted that the Rule does not 
apply to present or future interests that vest at their creation, regardless of 
when it becomes vested in possession, and pointed out that a typical oil and 
gas lease actually conveys the mineral estate as a determinable fee subject 
to the lessor’s possibility of reverter if the condition terminating the 
determinable fee occurs.22  The court pointed out that the possibility of 
reverter vests at the time the lease is executed, although same is not 
possessory at the time of execution.23 
BP argued that to the extent Laddex acquired the Lessors’ possibility of 
reverter, the lease’s language precluded vesting of that interest until the 
occurrence of a future event, namely the filing of written releases, or upon a 
court judgment terminating the lease becoming final and unappealable.24  
The court held that the Laddex lease resulted in a present “partial 
alienation” of the Lessors’ possibility of reverter, and that Laddex had 
acquired an estate capable of ripening into a fee simple determinable 
interest upon expiration of the underlying lease, and, as such, did not 
violate the Rule.25 
As to the second point of inquiry, the court pointed out that under Skelly 
Oil Co. v. Archer, a determination whether a well is producing in paying 
quantities is a question of fact for the jury, with the lessor having the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. 479, 482. 
 22. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). 
 23. Id. (citing Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. 1991)); see also 
Kelly v. Womack, 268 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1954); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 
1991). 
 24. Laddex, 513 S.W.3d at 480.  
 25. Id. at 482. 
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burden of proving a lack of such production in order to terminate a lease.26 
Further, the court emphasized Clifton principles in its holding, such as 
“there can be no limit as to time, whether it be days, weeks or months, to be 
taken into consideration in determining whether paying production from a 
lease has ceased.”27 BP urged that although reversal based on the trial 
court’s jury charge limiting the jury’s consideration to only the 15 month 
period of decreased production was warranted, it was instead entitled to 
rendition of a judgment in its favor, rather than remand, because the 
evidence conclusively established the lease’s profitability over a reasonable 
period of time.28 The court, in affirming the court of appeals, held that the 
jury charge did not allow the jury to fulfill its duties and that a reasonable 
jury could have differed as to whether the well ceased to produce in paying 
quantities, and therefore remand for a new trial was proper.29 
2. BP America Production Company v. Red Deer Resources, LLC30 
A 1962 lease covered 2113 acres, and provided for a five year primary 
term.31 By April, 2009, only production from the Vera Murray Well No. 11 
was maintaining the lease.32 In 1994, that well was averaging 200 Mcf per 
day, but when BP acquired the lease in 2000 production was less than 100 
Mcf per day, and by 2009 had declined to less than 10 Mcf per day.33 
Between March and June 2011, Red Deer acquired top leases, which gave 
Red Deer the right to sue to terminate BP’s lease.34 In May 2012, the well 
ceased to produce for seven days and then resumed producing, but only 
every other day, and ceased to produce altogether for eight days beginning 
June 4.35 BP shut in the well on June 12 and tendered shut-in payments 
June 13, designating June 13, 2012 as the beginning of the shut-in period.36 
The Shut In Provision of the lease at issue provides:  
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id. at 482-83 (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Archer, 356 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. 1961)).  
 27. Id. at 482-83 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 28. Id. at 484. 
 29. Id. at 486-87. 
 30. No. 15-0569, 2017 WL 1553112 (Tex. Apr. 28, 2017, reh’g overruled Sept. 22, 
2017). 
 31. Id. at *1. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
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Where gas from any well capable of producing gas . . . is not 
sold or used after the primary term and this lease is not otherwise 
maintained, lessee may pay or tender as shut-in royalty . . . , 
payable annually on or before the end of each twelve-month 
period during which such gas is not sold or used . . . and it shall 
be considered that gas is produced in paying quantities, and this 
lease shall remain in force for each twelve-month period for 
which shut-in royalty is so paid or tendered . . . .37   
The Cessation of Production provision reads:  “[i]f production from said 
land . . . should cease . . . this lease shall not terminate if lessee commences 
mining, drilling or reworking operations on or before the expiration of sixty 
days from . . . cessation of production.”38  
Red Deer sued in August 2012, alleging termination because the well 
had not produced in paying quantities for the time period ended June 12, 
2012.39 Red Deer also asserted that there was an unexcused total cessation 
of production, incapable of rescue by payment of shut-in royalty, since the 
well was incapable of producing in paying quantities on June 13, 2012.40  
The jury found that the lease did not fail to produce in paying quantities for 
the period ended June 12, 2012, but had terminated because of a total 
cessation of production on June 13, 2012.41 The appellate court affirmed.42 
In its analysis, the supreme court noted that Red Deer bore the burden of 
proving that the well in question experienced a total cessation of production 
for a period of at least 60 days, and that no savings provision, such as the 
shut-in royalty clause, would maintain the lease during that time.43 The 
lease at issue provides that it shall survive on payment of shut-in payment 
being made within one year after gas is last “sold or used” from a well 
capable of producing gas.44  Facts indicated that the last date any gas was 
sold or used was June 4, and BP tendered shut-in payments June 13, 2012.45 
The Court stated that a retroactive shut-in clause, such as the one at issue, 
allows the operator to shut-in a well up to twelve months after production 
ceases, with constructive production relating back to the date gas was last 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at *2. 
 38. Id.   
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at *5.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at *1.  
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sold or used, and that to negate BP’s invocation of its shut-in rights, Red 
Deer must prove that the well was incapable of production in paying 
quantities over a reasonable time period as of June 4, 2012.46 Looking at the 
trial record, the court noted that Red Deer had not obtained such a finding.47 
Moreover, the court found that the jury charge was improper, insofar as 
same instructed the jury to determine whether June 13, 2012 was the 
relevant date to consider in deciding whether the well was incapable of 
producing in paying quantities, since that was not the date gas was last sold 
or used.48 Accordingly, the court reversed the appellate court’s decision and 
rendered a take-nothing judgment in favor of BP.49 
B. Operations 
1. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Lazy R Ranch, et al.50 
ExxonMobil conducted operations on the Lazy R Ranch for nearly 60 
years until it sold its operations in 2008.51 The Ranch hired an 
environmental manager to determine the extent of any contamination 
caused by ExxonMobil’s operations, if any.52 That report, dated March 31, 
2009, identified 4 areas totaling 1.20 acre where hydrocarbon 
contamination levels exceeded state limits, and warned of a threat posed by 
same to groundwater.53 In October of that year, the Ranch sued; its 
amended petition sought injunctive relief requiring remediation, regardless 
of the cost.54 ExxonMobil moved for summary judgment, alleging the 
claims were barred by the statute of limitations; that plaintiffs were not, as a 
matter of law, entitled to the requested relief; and that there was no 
evidence of diminution of the value of the property.55 The trial court 
granted ExxonMobil’s summary judgment motion, which decision was 
overturned by the appellate court.56 
In its review, the supreme court noted that as to two of the four sites, 
operations had ceased prior to 2005, and any contamination at those sites 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at *5.  
 47. Id. at *8.  
 48. Id. at *9. 
 49. Id. at *10.  
 50. 511 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. 2017). 
 51. Id. at 539.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 539-40. 
 54. Id. at 540-41. 
 55. Id. at 541. 
 56. Id. at 542.  
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must necessarily have occurred before then, and therefore ExxonMobil’s 
claim was barred.57 As to the other two tracts, the court noted conflicting 
evidence regarding when contamination might have occurred, and reversed 
the granting of summary judgment.58 
The Ranch argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled by the 
discovery rule,  which applies when an injury is found to be objectively 
verifiable and inherently undiscoverable during the limitations period, and 
would result in its claims accruing until they were or should reasonably 
have been discovered.59 The court noted that application of the discovery 
rule in nuisance cases is rare, as the condition giving cause to the claim is 
generally obvious and apparent.60 Further, trial testimony established that 
the ranch owner often observed and was routinely informed of spills and 
cleanup operations; as a result, the court stated that there was nothing 
inherent in the possibility of contamination that kept the Ranch from hiring 
its environmental consultant sooner than it did.61 
Finally, the Court affirmed Texas’s adherence to the “economic 
feasibility exception” in establishing damages for land contamination, but 
limiting repair costs to the loss in the land’s value due to the objectionable 
harm.62 
2. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC63 
Anadarko entered an oil and gas lease with the State of Texas on a 
wildlife area, which lease contained restrictions on Anadarko’s ability to 
use the surface for exploration and production operations.64 In response, 
Anadarko entered into a surface use and subsurface easement agreement 
with Briscoe Ranch, the owner of an adjacent tract, which would allow it to 
use the surface of that tract to drill from and through in order to access its 
leasehold on the adjacent to the state-owned tract.65 The mineral estate 
underlying the Briscoe Ranch tract was under lease to Lightning.66 
Lightning sued, alleging trespass and tortious interference with contract, 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See id. at 543-44. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 544.  
 60. Id. & n.20 (citing Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 
2004)). 
 61. ExxonMobil, 511 S.W.3d at 544.  
 62. Id. at 545. 
 63. 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017). 
 64. Id. at 43.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
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and seeking injunctive relief.67 The district court dismissed Lightning’s 
claim, which ruling was affirmed by the appellate court.68 
In its review, the supreme court noted that Lightning’s claim centered on 
whether a mineral lessee’s rights include the ability to preclude the surface 
owner’s activities not intended to capture the lessee’s minerals, but 
intended only to traverse through them.69 In addressing the trespass claim, 
the court noted its earlier holding in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, 
that the surface overlying a leased mineral estate is the surface owner’s 
property, and those rights include the geological structures beneath the 
surface, and a Fifth Circuit case applying Texas law, concluding that the 
surface owner owns all non-mineral molecules of the land, i.e., the mass 
that undergirds the surface estate.70 
Following a review of the dominant estate theory set forth in Getty Oil 
Co. v. Jones,71 which establishes the right of the mineral owner to use so 
much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to produce and remove the 
minerals therefrom, the court noted limitations on that dominance, and 
pointed out that “the rights conveyed by a mineral lease generally 
encompass the rights to explore, obtain, produce and possess the minerals 
subject to the lease; they do not include the right to possess the specific 
place or space where the minerals are located.”72 Thus, an unauthorized 
interference with the place where the minerals are located constitutes a 
trespass as to the mineral estate only if the interference infringes on the 
lessee’s ability to exercise its rights.73 The court noted that Lightning 
speculated that Anadarko’s proposed locations and operations might 
interfere with Lightning’s planned use of the property, but that mere 
speculation was not enough to justify the granting of injunctive relief, 
which requires proof of imminent, irreparable harm.74 
Lightning also argued that Anadarko’s operations would result in a loss 
of minerals to which Lightning would otherwise be entitled.75 In response, 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 45-46. 
 68. Id. at 43.  
 69. Id. at 45-46 
 70. Id. at 46-47 (citing Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 
1974)); see also Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431 
(5th Cir. 2011). 
 71. 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971).  
 72. Lighting Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 48-49 (applying principles of Getty Oil Co. and 
progeny to support dominance and limitations of the mineral estate in Texas). 
 73. Id. at 49. 
 74. Id. (citing Batnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002)). 
 75. See id. at 50-51. 
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the Court held that “the loss of minerals Lightning will suffer . . . is not a 
sufficient injury to support a claim for trespass.”76  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court indicated that it was weighing “the interests of society 
and the oil and gas industry against the interest of the individual operator,” 
and finding that Anadarko’s proposed operations would allow for 
recovering the most minerals while drilling the fewest wells, resulting in 
reduced waste.77 Finally, the court pointed out that Lightning’s tortious 
interference claim must necessarily fail, since Anadarko had the legal right 
to do what it planned to do.78 
3. Ring Energy v. Trey Res., Inc.79 
Trey Resources, Inc. applied for and obtained nine permits from the 
Railroad Commission (the “RRC”) to inject fluids into designated wells in 
Andrews County.80 Ring Energy, Inc. contends that Trey did not 
substantially comply with the requirement to provide a copy of the 
application to any surface owner or operator within a half mile of an 
injection well.81 Ring did not protest the permits with the RRC; the RRC 
granted the applications.82 Before Trey began any injection operations, 
Ring sued in Andrews County seeking injunctive relief, claiming that it 
would suffer irreparable waste damage.83 Trey moved to dismiss on the 
basis that Ring did not exhaust its administrative remedies before the RRC 
and any such appeal must be filed in Travis County.84 The trial court 
granted Trey’s motion.85 
The court focused on two provisions of the Texas Natural Resources 
Code; in particular, Section 85.321 and Section 85.322.86 Those provisions, 
respectively, reads as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 50 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
 78. Id. at 53. 
 79. No. 08-15-00080-CV, 2017 WL 192911 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 18, 2017, no 
pet.). 
 80. Id. at *1. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at *2.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. See id. at *5. 
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[A] party . . . that may be damaged by another party[’s] . . . 
waste . . . may sue for and recover damages and have any other 
relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity.87 
[N]o suit by or against the commission . . . shall impair or 
abridge or delay a cause of action for damages or other relief that 
an owner of land or a producer . . . [might have for violation of a 
rule or order of the commission].88 
Trey argued that if Ring suffers damages such a claim would be cognizable 
under § 85.321, but only as to an action filed in Travis County.89 Ring 
responded that § 85.321 grants the state courts jurisdiction to hear claims 
for injunctive relief.90 The court determined, after analyzing the the statutes 
using several grammatical and stylistic approaches, that § 85.322 allows 
litigants to obtain injunctive relief at courts outside of Travis County.91   
Trey also contended that the RRC has exclusive jurisdiction over 
injection wells until all administrative remedies have been exhausted.92 The 
court noted that, in addition to § 85.321 and § 85.322, another Texas 
appellate court recently determined that the RRC did not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over injection wells in In re Discovery Operating, Inc..93   
Because the court determined that both the RRC and the court have 
authority to review and adjudicate initial disputes, it again relied on In re 
Discovery and the lack of “a clear remedy before the RRC” to find that the 
RRC did not have primary jurisdiction.94  
The court ultimately held that “the Legislature intended to allow 
preinjury injunctive relief in the county where the injury is threatened,” and 
reversed the trial court to allow Ring the opportunity to demonstrate its 
need for injunctive relief.95   
  
                                                                                                                 
 87. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (West 2011). 
 88. Id. § 85.322. 
 89. Ring Energy, 2017 WL 192911, at *5.  
 90. Id.  
 91. See id. at *8.  
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. at *9 (citing 216 S.W.3d 898 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, orig. proceeding)). 
 94. Id. at *10 (citation omitted). 
 95. Id. at *12.  
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4. Crystal River Oil & Gas, LLC v. Patton96 
A 1948 lease (the “Scoggins Lease”) covering property in Stonewall 
County contained the following provisions: 
2. Subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease 
shall be for a term of ten years from this date (called “primary 
term”) and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is 
produced from said land hereunder. 
5. If prior to discovery of oil or gas on said land Lessee should 
drill a dry hole or holes thereon, or if after discovery of oil, or 
gas the production thereof should cease from any cause, this 
lease shall not terminate if Lessee commences additional drilling 
or re-working operations within sixty (60) days thereafter . . . .97 
After 20 years of production of oil and saltwater, the saltwater disposal 
well on the property became inoperable and the producing wells were shut 
down.98  Robert Patton reviewed the RRC production records, decided to 
lease the property covered by the Scoggins Lease based on his observation 
that there had been no production for several months and sent a letter to 
Crystal River Oil & Gas, LLC and RMS Monte Christo, LLC contending 
that the Scoggins Lease had terminated.99   
At trial, the jury was asked whether “the Defendants fail[ed] to 
commence drilling or reworking activities on the producing wells in 
question within 60 days after the wells ceased to produce oil and gas?100 At 
issue in this case is whether the jury question erroneously included the 
phrase “on the producing wells in question” and whether its inclusion 
prevented the jury from considering reworking activities performed on the 
saltwater disposal well.101 
While the jury question presented largely conformed to the Texas Pattern 
Jury Charges for such question, the pattern jury charges do not restrict 
reworking to only work performed on producing wells.102 The court 
identified “re-working operations” as a key undefined phrase in this 
                                                                                                                 
 96. 510 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, no pet.). 
 97. Id. at 228.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 228-29. 
 102. Id. at 229.  
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lease.103 Relying on the guidance of Cox v. Stowers,104 which defined 
“reworking operations” without restricting operations to work performed on 
the producing wells, the court focused on “what an ordinarily competent 
operator would do under the same or similar circumstances to restore 
production.”105 The court noted that William & Meyers Oil and Gas Law § 
618.1 cites approvingly to precedent offered by Crystal River in Pro-Chem, 
Inc. v. Lassetter Petroleum, Inc., in which a Kansas court held that “work 
done to secure the use of a saltwater disposal well can constitute reworking 
operations under a cessation-of-production clause.”106 
The court held that “in the absence of a restriction in the lease that only 
work performed on the producing wells constitutes reworking operations, 
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the jury 
question to only work performed on the producing wells.”107 Because the 
error in the jury charge related to the critically contested issue, the court 
found that the trial court’s error caused harm and remanded the case for a 
new trial.108 
C. Pooling 
1. Samson Exploration, LLC v. T.S. Reed Properties, Inc.109 
Samson Exploration formed two pooled units, the Joyce DuJay No. 1 
Gas Unit and the Joyce DuJay “A” No. 1 Gas Unit.110  The units overlapped 
one another as to depths and acreage for the most part, but the “A” No. 1 
Unit included one additional lease not included in the No. 1 Unit.111 One 
well was located upon land included in both units, and produced from the 
interval pooled in both.112 Samson paid royalties on this well under the first 
unit (which did not include the additional lease), contending that the second 
unit was invalid, and the unpaid lessors sued.113 
In seeking to excuse its error, Samson argued that pooling necessarily 
effects a cross-conveyance of title and that a pooled unit is not valid unless 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id.  
 104. 786 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ). 
 105. Crystal River, 510 S.W.3d at 229-30. 
 106. Id. at 230 (citation omitted). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 231. 
 109. 521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017). 
 110. Id. at 771. 
 111. Id. at 772. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 773. 
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title is cross-conveyed, and that since title cannot be conveyed twice, and 
the production interval for the disputed unit was previously committed to 
another pooled unit, the subsequently pooled unit was invalid.114  The trial 
and appellate courts rejected this approach, and the supreme court affirmed, 
holding:  
Under the law in Texas, pooling implicates both contract and 
property law—authority to pool emanates from contract but 
pooing agreements give rise to interests in realty.The cross-
conveyance theory of title can be critical . . . but Samson’s 
argument in this case is a theoretical construct that holds no 
water. Considering the pertinent authority, we discern no 
impediment to enforcing Samson’s obligations in this case under 
a contract theory even if the pooling designation failed to effect a 
new conveyance of title.115 
Moreover, the court pointed out that although its holding would have an 
adverse economic impact on Samson, the holding was brought about by 
Samson’s own making.116 
D. Conveyance and Deed Construction 
1. James H. Davis, Individually and D/B/A JD Minerals, and JDMI, LLC 
v. Mark Muelle117 
A 1991 mineral deed to JD Minerals imprecisely described ten tracts of 
land in the following manner: “1) 704.00 acres out of the G.W. PETTY, ET 
AL, A-582, ET AL, known as the ‘AMOCO PRODUCING COMPANY – 
JOHN HARRISON JR. ‘B’.”118 Following the putative descriptions was the 
statement that “Grantor agrees to execute any supplemental instrument 
requested by Grantee for a more complete or accurate description of said 
land.”119  Beneath that was the following paragraph: 
The “Lands” subject to this deed also include all strips, gores, 
roadways, water bottoms and other lands adjacent to or 
contiguous with the lands specifically described above and 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. at 770. 
 115. Id. at 777-78. 
 116. Id. at 780-81. 
 117. No. 16-0155, 2017 WL 2299316 (Tex. May 26, 2017, reh’g overruled Sept. 22, 
2017). 
 118. Id. at *1 n.8.  
 119. Id. at *1. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss3/22
2017] Texas 831 
 
 
owned or claimed by Grantors.  If the description above proves 
incorrect in any respect or does not include these adjacent or 
contiguous lands, Grantor shall, without additional 
consideration, execute, acknowledge and deliver to Grant[ee], its 
successors and assigns, such instruments as are useful or 
necessary to correct the description and evidence such correction 
in the appropriate public records. Grantor hereby conveys to 
Grantee all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty 
interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not 
same is herein above correctly described.120 
In 2011, the Grantor in the 1991 deed conveyed the same specific 
properties to Mark J. Mueller, but employing more precise descriptions.121  
Mueller then sued Davis to quiet title to the mineral interests, arguing that 
the descriptions in the 1991 deed were insufficient to satisfy the Statute of 
Frauds, requiring that property to be conveyed be identified with reasonable 
certainty.122 At trial, Davis’s motion for summary judgment was granted, 
and a take-nothing judgment issued against Mueller.123 
On appeal, Mueller argued that the general granting clause, that 
purporting to convey all of Grantor’s interest in Harrison County, is 
ambiguous, because it was located in the same paragraph as the Mother 
Hubbard clause, a catch-all for small, overlooked interests.124  The appellate 
court agreed and reversed, concluding that the intent of the parties was a 
fact issue to be decided by a jury.125 
The supreme court, in its review, acknowledged that the specific 
property descriptions in the 1991 deed failed to satisfy the statute of frauds, 
but also noted the long-standing recognition of general granting clauses as 
valid and effective.126 The court rejected Mueller’s argument that the 
location of the general grant in proximity to the Mother Hubbard clause 
rendered it ambiguous and noted that if the general grant were held to apply 
only to the small strips contemplated by the Mother Hubbard clause, it 
would accomplish nothing other than that accomplished by the Mother 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at *2.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. & n.21 (citing Holloway’s Unknown Heirs v. Whatley, 131 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. 
1939); Smith v. Westall, 13 S.W. 540 (Tex. 1890); Witt v. Harlan, 2 S.W. 41 (Tex. 1886)). 
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Hubbard clause itself.127 The court concluded by stating that the “general 
grant’s conveyance of ‘all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding royalty 
interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not same is 
herein above correctly described’ could not be clearer.  All means all.”128  
2. Benedict G. Wenske & Elizabeth Wenske v. Steve Ealy and Deborah 
Ealy129 
A 1998 mineral deed reserved a one-fourth (1/4th) nonparticipating 
royalty for a term of 25 years.130 The Grantees under that deed later sold the 
property, in 2003, reserving an undivided three-eighths (3/8th) mineral 
interest.131 The later deed provided that if the mineral estate was subject to 
an existing lease or production, the lease or production, and the benefits 
from it, would be allocated in proportion to ownership in the mineral 
estate.132 The mineral interest was made subject to the one-fourth (1/4) 
royalty previously reserved.133 
In 2011, the Grantors and Grantees under the 2003 deed entered into an 
oil and gas lease, and a dispute subsequently arose as to who would bear the 
nonparticipating royalty burden, the Grantors urging that their mineral 
interest was unencumbered by same and that the Grantees would bear all of 
it.134 Both the trial and appellate courts ruled that the burden was to be 
borne proportionately.135 
In affirming the lower courts, the supreme court acknowledged the 
historical application of strict rules for deed construction, and the modern 
approach based on determining the parties’ intent from the four corners of 
the instrument.136 In its rejection of mechanical, hard-and-fast rules of 
interpretation, the Court adopted a more holistic approach focused on the 
intent of the parties as expressed within the four corners of the deed, giving 
words their plain meaning, and harmonizing all parts of an instrument, even 
if particular parts appear contradictory or inconsistent.137 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at *3.  
 128. Id. (emphasis added). 
 129. 521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017). 
 130. Id. at 793. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 793-94. 
 135. Id. at 794.  
 136. See id. (citations omitted).  
 137. See id. at 797-99.  
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The court recognized the general rule that a previously reserved interest 
burdens the entire mineral estate, but held that such a rule is not necessarily 
determinative of the parties’ intent, since they are free to contract 
otherwise.138 
3. Greer v. Shook139 
A 1927 mineral deed was subject to an existing oil and gas lease.140 The 
deed conveyed  
an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) interest in and to all of the oil, 
gas and other minerals in, under and that may be produced . . . 
[G]rantee is purchasing one-half of the royalty and one-half (1/2) 
of the minerals . . . subject to [an existing oil and gas lease], but 
covers one-half (1/2) of all [royalty payable under said lease, and 
when the lease terminates an] undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) of 
the lease interest and all future rentals . . . shall be owned by . . . 
Grantee, he owning one sixteenth of all oil, gas and other 
minerals . . . .141  
The deed also stated that Grantee would never be required to join in the 
execution of future oil, gas and mineral leases.142 Long after the lease 
expired, a new lease was taken, providing for a one-fourth (1/4) royalty, 
and the lessee filed an interpleader action seeking a ruling as to the interest 
owned by the successors of the grantee in the 1927 deed.143 The trial court 
ruled that the Grantee’s successors were entitled to one-half (1/2) of the 
royalty provided for under the new lease, or one-eighth (1/8).144 The 
appellate court affirmed, finding ambiguity in the deed, but ruling that due 
to the near-universal use of one-eighth (1/8) royalties at the time of the deed 
in question and the fact that landowners commonly believed they only 
owned a one-eighth (1/8) interest rather than the entire mineral estate in the 
possibility of reverter (the “estate misconception” theory), meaning that the 
1927 deed conveyed an undivided one-half (1/2) nonexecutive mineral 
interest.145 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id.  
 139. 503 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). 
 140. Id. at 575-76. 
 141. Id. at 576. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See id. at 577. 
 144. Id. at 575. 
 145. See id. at 590-92. 
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4. Laborde Properties, L.P. v. U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC146 
A 1951 deed contained the following reservation:  
There is reserved and excepted . . . an undivided one-half interest 
in and to the . . . royalty . . . in and under and that may be 
produced . . . , same being equal to an undivided one-sixteenth. 
This reservation is what is generally termed a nonparticipating 
Royalty Reservation[.]147 
A dispute subsequently arose regarding whether the reservation entitled 
the grantors’ successors to one-half (1/2) of the one-fifth (1/5) royalty for 
provided for under a current lease, or a fixed one-sixteenth (1/16).148 The 
trial court ruled that they were entitled to one-half (1/2) of one-fifth (1/5).149 
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, holding that to rule otherwise 
would be to require it to ignore the plain language in the deed calling for 
“same being equal to an undivided one-sixteenth.”150 
5. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.151 
In dispute in this case is the interest conveyed by a 1903 deed from 
W.H.C. Goode to Panhandle & Gulf Railway Company which states that 
“the said party of the first . . . does GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL, 
RELINQUISH and CONVEY unto the said party of the second part, and 
unto its successors and assigns, . . . , for a right of way, that certain strip of 
land hereinafter described.”152 The deed includes a description of a 
surveyed line and describes “the said railway right of way being 100 feet 
wide on each side of the center line.”153 The deed includes a habendum 
clause which purports to define the interest being conveyed as being “in fee 
simple, unto the said party of the second party . . . its successors and assigns 
forever.”154   
                                                                                                                 
 146. 04-16-00168-CV, 2016 WL 5922404 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 12, 
2016), reconsideration en banc denied 04-16-00168-CV, 2016 WL 7445084 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Dec. 28, 2016, no pet.) 
 147. Id. at *1.  
 148. Id. at *2.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at *10.  
 151. No. 08-16-00119-CV, 2017 WL 1076540 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 22, 2017, no 
pet.). 
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 153. Id. at *2.  
 154. Id.  
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After determining that the use of the phrase “right of way” does 
automatically convey only an easement, the court next applied to its review 
the “Neale rule” which says: 
[A] deed which by the terms of the granting clause grants, sells 
and conveys to the grantee a “right of way” in or over a tract of 
land conveys only an easement . . . [but] a deed which in the 
granting clause grants, sells and conveys a tract or strip of land 
conveys the title in fee, even though in a subsequent clause or 
paragraph of the deed the land conveyed is referred to as a right 
of way.155 
Because the deed at issue has blended language, the court found that 
application of the Neale rule was not dispositive as to what was 
conveyed.156 Nevertheless, the court held that this deed is a surface 
easement, reasoning that use of the word “over” in the opening clause 
shows that Goode did not intend to convey the entirety of the land 
described and the phrase “for a right of way” in front of the phrase “strip of 
land” could be understood as limiting the nature of the conveyance.157 
Finally, the court considered the use of the phrase “fee simple” in the 
habendum clause.158  Acknowledging that “fee simple” can often be used 
both to describe the size of the estate and rights associated therewith, as 
well as the term of any durational or conditional qualifiers.159 Understood 
as the latter, there would be no conflict between the granting language and 
the habendum clause; the granting clause would define the type of property 
rights, while the habendum would identify the term.160 While the court 
recognized that this approach is “rational, intuitive and sensible” it declined 
to adopt this approach due to the lack of Texas authority.161 
  
                                                                                                                 
 155. Id. at *4 (quoting Tex. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Neale, 151 Tex. 526, 252 S.W.2d 451, 453 
(1952)). 
 156. Chevron Midcontinent, 2017 WL 1076540, at *5.  
 157. See id. at *6-7.  
 158. Id. at *8. 
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E. Pipelines 
1. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC v. Texas Rice Land Partners, 
Ltd.162 
In 2007, Denbury began to plan and construct a carbon dioxide pipeline 
over land owned by Texas Rice Land Partners, which was contested by the 
landowner.163 In response, Denbury filed the required form with the RRC, 
claiming common carrier status, which would allow it to exercise eminent 
domain authority, and also filed suit seeking injunctive relief against Texas 
Rice Land.164 While proceedings were underway, Denbury completed its 
survey and commenced construction of the pipeline.165 At the time, Texas 
pipeline companies were able to claim common carrier status simply by so 
indicating on RCC form T-4.166 
When this controversy first reached the Texas Supreme Court, the court 
held that in order to authorize eminent domain, the Texas Constitution 
requires objective evidence that the pipeline will serve the public, rather 
than the builder’s exclusive use.167 Further, the court enunciated a new test, 
one requiring that once challenged, the party claiming common carrier 
status must prove “a reasonable probability that the pipeline will at some 
point after construction serve the public by transporting gas for one or more 
customers who will either retain ownership of their gas or sell it to parties 
other than the carrier.”168 Looking at the facts in issue, the court held that 
Denbury’s claimed intent to negotiate with unaffiliated parties for the 
transport of their gas raised only the possibility, and not a reasonable 
probability, that the pipeline once completed would serve the public, and 
remanded the matter to the District Court of Jefferson County (the “district 
court”).169 The district court heard evidence of transportation agreements 
with unaffiliated parties which were entered into post-construction, and 
granted Denbury’s motion for summary judgment, finding Denbury to be a 
common carrier, and thus entitled to eminent domain authority.170 
                                                                                                                 
 162. 510 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2017) 
 163. Id. at 911.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 912.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 913 (citing  Tex. Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, 
LLC, 363 S.W. 3d 192, 200 (Tex. 2012)). 
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The Beaumont Court of Appeals overturned the district court ruling, 
holding in essence that the pipeline company was required to prove it had 
the intent to serve as a common carrier at the time the pipeline was 
proposed.171 That decision was overturned by the supreme court, which 
reinstated the district court’s decision.172 
In its opinion, the court noted that its “reasonable probability test” is an 
objective one, not requiring the pipeline company to prove the necessary 
intent prior to construction, and instead allowed that evidence of post-
construction contracts with unaffiliated parties were relevant and 
admissible.173 The court pointed out that such contracts could be used to 
establish a reasonable probability that at some point after construction the 
pipeline would serve the public, and also to establish specific potential 
customers near the pipeline’s route.174 The court also identified  the 
regulatory atmosphere, the proximity of the pipeline to potential customers, 
and the actual use by unaffiliated parties as potentially relevant evidence.175  
III. Texas Legislative Update 
A. House Bill 1818176 
Effective September 1, 2017, Section 81.01001(a) of the Natural 
Resources Code is amended to provide for the continuance of the RRC until 
September 1, 2029.  Sections 81.065 and 81.066 are added to the Natural 
Resources Code, requiring, in the instance of Section 81.065, that the RRC 
to develop and implement a policy to encourage the use of appropriate 
alternative dispute resolution procedures for addressing disputes under the 
commission’s jurisdiction, and requiring in the instance of Section 81.066, 
that the oil and gas division of the RRC develop an annual plan to use oil 
and gas monitoring and enforcement resources to ensure public safety and 
protect the environment. With respect to Section 81.066, the Commission 
must seek input from stakeholders, maintain information about monitoring 
and enforcement efforts, and collect data regarding violations of statutes or 
Commission rules related to oil and gas. The plan will be published 
annually on the Commission’s website no later than July 1 of the year 
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 176. Act of May 10, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., Tex. H.B. 1818 (amending TEX. NAT. RES. 
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preceding the year in which the plan will be implemented. Section 81.071 is 
also added to the Natural Resources Code, providing that the commission 
may establish pipeline safety and regulatory fees to be assessed for permits 
or registrations for pipelines, specifically including the establishment of 
fees to be assessed annually against permit or registration holders. Such 
fees should be sufficient to support pipeline sage and regulatory program 
costs and may be based on any number of factors, including the length of 
the pipeline, the number of new permits or registrations, or the number of 
pipeline systems.  
B. House Bill 129177 
Effective September 1, 2017, Sections 91.501 and 91.506 of the Natural 
Resources Code are amended to provide that the information required by 
Section 91.502 to be delivered to the royalty interest owner must be 
included on the check stub, an attachment to the payment form, or another 
remittance advice that accompanies the payment unless the payor has the 
consent of the royalty interest owner to provide the information in another 
manner. 
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